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II.1. Designing an area-based economic development program Once the Title XX social service monies were no longer available, the strategic plan lost three of the four key principles of the initial plan (the HUD language of "Economic Opportunity," "Sustainable Community Development," "Community-Based Partnership," and "Strategic Vision for Change") and was reduced to an economic development plan with small components for the other principles. According to the briefing, published on February 19th, 1996, the SEZ (plan) aims to: – Provide opportunity and assistance to new businesses that will create jobs and provide needed services;– Improve and enhance the competitiveness of existing industries, safeguarding jobs and creating new opportunities; – Foster the development of emerging industries in transportation, health care and arts and entertainment; and, – Create a viable workforce by improving job training, child care, housing and educational opportunities for residents. This language is clearly focused on economic development, and social service issues are only small footnotes to the process. It is actually the challenge for all participants to harness funds for the community development issues left out by the design of the LACDB, as the sole solution for the SEZ. Since EDI funding was the only remaining alternative, the Mayor’s office took the lead and established a non-commercial lending institution (i.e., the Los Angeles Community Development Bank) that would promote job growth in the SEZ neighborhoods. This was done with little community, or for that matter, multi-agency, input. The initial important players were the former Deputy Mayor, two lawyers from a private firm who helped with the legal processes and the development of the appropriate documents, and two other influential businessmen, one of whom later became the Chief Executive Officer of the bank (based on personal interviews). [This group apparently came up with the idea of the bank.] Interestingly, the City’s Community Development Department (CDD), which is really the pass-through agency for the Bank’s money, was excluded from the initial design process, but was brought back into meetings in late May, 1995. An explanation offered for this process (keeping inter-departmental problems in mind) was that HUD didn’t want the City to make political decisions about the money. HUD actually pushed for the Bank to be independent of the City, but there were disagreements surrounding that issue, at least for the next couple of years. Based on the final design format, the Bank negotiates with HUD directly; however, for financial reasons, it requests money from the City (CDD), which in turn requests the money from HUD without examining the content of the request. Based on our local knowledge, the relationship between the LACDB and the CDD seems to have emerged as part of an incremental decision-making process. While the CDD does have a role in the overall operation of the Bank, it has little or no influence on its day-to-day operations. In the design and procedural development of the LACDB, the Mayor’s office, with assistance from the local HUD office, provided the majority of the support. A number of council district representatives, especially the councilman from District 1, which encompasses Latino neighborhoods west and north of the Los Angeles Central Business District, were involved in advancing the idea and pushing for the final development and implementation of the Bank. After the City Council approval of the HUD agreements in October, 1995, the LACDB Board began to hold its first meetings. The final County appointment occurred in December of 1995 and in the first and second quarter of 1996, the Bank was to hire a CEO and staff to operationalize the LACDB functions. During this period, the Mayor’s office provided support staff and the City CDD helped with the procedural aspects of the operation (e.g., holding orientation meetings for the SEZ Oversight Committee). These delays created a high level of public anxiety, which was reflected in a May 26th, 1996 (?) article in the Los Angeles Times. At that point, little was known about how and when the bank would begin offering loans. While the goal of hiring a CEO had been achieved, the staff and the intermediaries for the community connection and micro-lending had not been identified. By design, the LACDB emerged as one of the largest non-commercial banks established for the sole purpose of economic development. In total, HUD provided $430 million ($115 million in EDI, $15 million of which was targeted for the few areas that fall in the County jurisdiction and $315 million in section 108, $15 million of which was designated for the County). Because the $315 million was in loan guarantees, it must be paid back. This puts the Bank under pressure to be a successful lending agency. In an interview with the Los Angeles Times (…), Andrew Cuomo, then the Secretary of HUD, indicated that the balancing trick for the LACDB was to create jobs for the community and be a flexible bank, but also to protect taxpayer dollars (this refers to the loan guarantee monies). This meant that despite the perception of a large sum of money being given to the bank, the funding was not the bank’s to lose. Despite this harsh reality, there is little evidence that an acceptable default rate was ever established by the bank, even though the Section 108 application refers to a leveraging factor of 4 to 1. In addition to the federal dollars, commercial banks also committed $210 million, bringing the total of "imaginary funds" to $640 million. The role of the commercial banks and business representation on the board was an attempt to remedy previous application shortcomings (i.e., private sector commitment). The bank’s design for lending practices was clearly based on diverse perspectives of what may or may not work in targeted communities. The final allocation for expenditures fell into the following categories: – Microloans (will be mostly done through the intermediaries)– Business loans – Commercial Real Estate loans – Commercial loan guarantees – Loan loss reserves – Venture capital – Business and technical support – Economic development grant Based to the Section 108 application, the Bank estimated that $200-300 million will be used to make loans available to qualified applicants, generally ranging from $25,000 to $10 million, $25-50 million will be used to cover any loan defaults, $50-100 million will be set aside for venture capital to fund investments at increments of $500,000 or more and an additional $10 million to fund investments in the under $500,000 category, while $5-15 million is to be used for economic development grants. According to this plan, miscellaneous revenues may be used to fund social services programs. In support of this program, another $4.7 million was earmarked for business expansion and technical assistance in the SEZ, the City of Los Angeles adopted a $2.3 million Annual Business Tax Relief Program in January of 1995, and both City and County committed over $5.6 million of their property taxes over a five-year period to the redevelopment of the SEZ. As a one-time deal, the City also committed $5 million in CDBG money. Section N of the 108 Application identified the milestones based on the HUD approval date. These were: – July 1, 1995 or 60 Days after HUD approval: form the LACDB (Bank incorporated, Board of Directors established, Comprehensive CDB Agreement drafted, negotiated and executed. EDI grants and Section 108 Guarantees transferred from HUD to the City and the County and from them to LACDB) – August 1, 1995 or 120 days after HUD approval: 10% of available CDB capital committed – October 1, 1995 or 180 days after HUD approval: 20% of available CDB capital committed – April 1, 1996 or 12 months after HUD approval: 35% of available CDB capital committed – October 1, 1996 or 18 months after HUD approval: 50% of available CDB capital committed Obviously, because of the delay in the hiring of the Chief Executive Officer, these original deadlines were missed. However, a February 2, 1996 document identified revised milestones as follows: – May 1995: Vice President Al Gore announces the plan to create the LACDB.– July 1995: The Los Angeles City Council and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors approve initial HUD agreements for the formation of the LACDB – October 1995: The Los Angeles City Council approves final agreements. – November 1995: The Los Angeles Board of Supervisors and HUD approve the final agreements, paving the way for official formation of the LACDB. – November 1995: Mayor Riordan (with approval of Los Angeles City Council), the LACDB incorporators and president of three Southern California universities appoint the LACDB Board of Directors. – November 1995: The LACDB Board of Directors holds a meeting. – December 1995: The County of Los Angeles announces its appointment to the LACDB Board of Directors. – December 1995: The Board of Directors hires a search firm to find a qualified CEO for the LACDB – December 1995: Arrangements are finalized with HUD to obtain access to $1 million in working capital to assist with start-up operations of the LACDB. – December 1995: Members of the LACDB board of directors begin working with the City and County of Los Angeles and HUD to define qualification requirements for potential bank intermediaries. – December 1995: An implementation team is formed to oversee day-to-day operations of the LACDB until a full-time staff can be hired. – First and Second Quarter of 1996: The LACDB expects to fund its first loans late in the first quarter or early in the second quarter of 1996. – First and Second Quarter of 1996: Board of Directors conducts search for bank CEO and full-time staff. While this timeline was met (post-facto), the lending component, which was the actual responsibility of the bank, did not begin until later. Prior to discussing the operational aspects of the Bank, it is important to note that despite the early involvement of the community in the design of the original EZ application, the onset of the SEZ meant that the community voice, short of its symbolic presence in the non-effectual Oversight Committee, was largely absent. While Gittell et al.’s first study (1996) of the EZ process did not include Los Angeles, their national findings indicate a similar problem in other jurisdictions. By and large, community organizations were able to exert more influence in the process of designing the original EZ application (i.e., Phase One), where strong coalitions already existed. The pattern remained the same even after two years (Gittell, et al., 1998). This suggests that political capital is an important complement to social capital in creating a comprehensive sense of empowerment. One may even argue that political capital is an important building block of social capital (it acts as a bridge to connect a community with the larger organizational structure around it). As such, it is no wonder that political institutions are resistant to incorporation, and that "politics as usual" can occur in the presence of an economic development agenda. II.2.a Governance Structure of the Bank and the "Voice" of the Community According to its vision statement of February, 1996, the SEZ program, embodied in the LACDB, aimed to: – Provide opportunity and assistance to new businesses that will create jobs and provide needed services;– Improve and enhance competitiveness of existing industries, safeguarding jobs and creating new opportunities; – Foster the development of emerging industries in transportation, health care and arts and entertainment; and, – Create a viable workforce by improving job training, child care, housing, and educational opportunities for residents. With no funding for the last goal, the LACDB’s vision translated into a business development/business assistance program, a fact that is obvious to many participants in this program. Given this vision, the governance structure of the LACDB was designed to consist of a 15-member Board of Directors, the majority of whom were appointed by the Mayor (and confirmed by the City Council) and the Bank’s initial incorporators. The voice of the community was to be captured in the form of city council districts’ representatives, and in a group that would be referred to as the Supplemental Empowerment Zone Oversight Committee (SEZOC), to which LACDB was required to make quarterly reports of its operations. The SEZOC itself was designed to include 12 members appointed as follows: – Six members appointed by each City Council Member representing the SEZ;– Four members appointed by the Mayor; and – Two members appointed by each Supervisor representing the EZ. At least half of the members of the LASEZOC had to be residents of the Zone and all 12 must be stakeholders (i.e., live, work, own property or do business in or provide services to residents in the Zone). In addition, each Council Member whose district is in the Zone was to establish a task force to coordinate Zone-related activities. The City and County were to provide Staff for the Zone (without any earmarked funding!). The role of the SEZOC was described as
The SEZOC inherited tasks without funding and became the token gesture of community involvement in an otherwise narrow economic development plan that focused only on business financing. While the original EZOC was designed to develop a work plan for spending $1 million for social services (which was not funded by HHS), the SEZ variation had no money to spend and was left with the task of seeking funds to help promote the other five goals of the original strategic plan (e.g. safety, sustainable communities, housing, education and family support). The final marching order of the SEZOC can be summarized in the following tasks: 1) Update the strategic plan as appropriate, 2) Establish benchmarks and update annually; 3) Monitor progress toward achieving benchmarks; 4) Make recommendations for use of surplus miscellaneous revenue from the Community Development Bank; 5) Ensure maximum community input in updating and monitoring the strategic plan and benchmarks; 6) Review waiver requests; 7) Assist in grant seeking or evaluating grant requests; 8) Provide community feedback to the Community Development Bank; 9) Provide general input to City and County on EZ matters; and 10) Review, recommend actions, and take positions on legislation impacting the EZ (CDD, April 26, 1996). For a non-funded committee, this is a tall order indeed, and the operation of the SEZOC became riddled with problems, the least of which was a politically hierarchical relationship with the Bank. Therefore, the eventual design for the community involvement included a disempowered SEZOC and a governance structure that was divided between the emerging bureaucracy of the LACDB and the existing political machine in the city and the county. The governance structure, below, indicates the marginality of the community and the centrality of the bank, in what was to become a journey to an eventual failure. Based on the politics of arrogance, the bank would face its challenge in the following years of its operation.
II.2 Performance of the Bank in the last five years Empowerment Zones with arguably larger community participation, such as in Detroit, created a momentum unlike any previous area-based initiative and achieved the largest accomplishments after two years of operation (Brownstein, 1996; Chandler, 1999). However, even in Detroit, the disproportionate role of the auto industry created questions about the level of business interference in the process of community development. Nonetheless, the fact remains that cities such as New York and Chicago lagged behind, due to structural problems, an important dimension of which was the minimal participation of the community in the design and the implementation of the EZ (Keating, 1999 and Gittell, et al., 1996 and 1998). In Los Angeles, a similar story can be traced. With the absence of the community from the process and the clear indication that the Bank was not a comprehensive community development tool, or even a complete economic development tool, the road to failure and mediocrity was paved. By July 3, 1997, more than a year after the appointment of the CEO and hiring of the staff, the LACDB had finalized six loans and was completing an additional 12. In value, this translated in $11.2 million of the Section 108 money (total amount of loans was $57.8 million) for the six loans and $21.5 million for the 12 pending ones. This was close to the new target established by the bank, which was listed in the revised Business Plan of July 15, 1996. This plan projected a total of $33,187,000 in loans, $5 million in loan guarantees and $4,359,350 in loan loss reserve by December, 1996. Three years later, the Bank reported a total lending and investment of $117 million to 121 borrowers (In 1999, a newspaper report indicated 132 loans, worth $73.1 million). Interestingly, about 75% of these loans were under $500,000, including micro-loans of $1,000 to $25,000. This means that a significant portion of the Bank’s customers were introduced through intermediaries, which are typically faith-based, community-based organizations, or other private organizations. The Bank’s reliance on community resources has paid off in securing successful smaller loans that are less likely to default in their payments. Despite this achievement, it is in the larger loans that the LACDB is facing its demise. This is exmplified by a multi-million dollar loan given to the Copeland Beverage Group (Santee Dairy in South Central Los Angeles), the legal upheaval around which is threatening the existence of the Bank. This began with the major funding of a $6 million loan, which was touted by then Vice President Al Gore, in 1998, as an example of inner-city investment that saved over 100 jobs (U.S.A. Today, April 4, 1999); however, within a year the tables turned on the company and suddenly the owners found themselves liable to the Bank for $10 million (the overall investment of the Bank in this dairy company reached close to $20 million). As accusations began to fly, it became clear that the LACDB’s style of doing business, which included protection of its assets, as well as lending to individuals that commercial banks refused to fund, had become a mixture of risk and heavy-handed oversight. The latter created a tense business environment within which the Bank began to interfere in many aspects of the business operation, including a seat on the company’s board. A higher degree of reporting and oversight translates to passing some of the liability to the Bank, which now finds itself the subject of a lawsuit from the company’s founder. Thought the lender liability is denied by the Bank, it is the court that will have the final word on this, unless some arrangement is made between the lender and the borrower. Since the beginning of this financial show-down, the LACDB CEO has resigned and the new CEO is none other than the previous head of Rebuild LA. III. Concluding Remarks Over its five-year life span, the LACDB has tried a number of different initiatives to invest in the social capital of the targeted census tracts. These are marked by a board composition that includes community advocates and individuals who have dedicated their lives to improving the quality of life in many of the inner-city communities. However, all the good-will of these individuals and attempts by the Bank to make up for the shortsightedness of its original design are not translating to a major success rate. In the words of Jack Kyser of the Los Angeles Economic Redevelopment Agency, "all these good intentions run into the real world" (Wood and Teicher, 1999). It would be ridiculous to expect that any one organization would be able to negate the eroding effects of capitalism, deep-rooted racism, and total neglect that have plagued the inner-cities of America over the course of the twentieth century. Empowerment Zones are "white-knight"2 approaches that last for a few years and disappear. The amount of money offered and the heavy-handedness with which the lender gets involved in the monitoring and operation of these businesses leaves little chance for a major overhaul of the inner-city economy. In the words of Landau (1988), the result is a "hyper innovation" phenomenon through which hundreds of economic and community development programs are created. The maze of bureaucracies and fragmented funding, combined with the expectation of miracle recoveries, has set up most of these programs for collective failure, mixed with occasional successes. While not all these programs3 are area-based initiatives, and in fact, in the U.S., more money is spent on person-based programs, the area-based initiatives are more usable politically in an electoral system that is tied to geography.
The lesson from Los Angeles is clear. Initiatives like the LACDB do very little to improve the economic and social condition of the inner-city poverty-stricken neighborhoods. As a bank insider indicated, the Bank was a business assistance program and not a community development program. This was a mayoral innovation with little constituency and few strong partnerships. Ironically, where the Bank excelled was in the area of micro-lending, which signals community support and direct involvement. The importance of micro-lending is in creating the much needed goods and service in the community. Here the Bank indirectly achieved one of its goals. However, the Bank built very little of an infrastructure, socially or politically, to enhance the chances of sustainability for business retention or attraction. Bringing America’s large companies back to the inner-city requires the education of these companies about the economic potential of these areas. However, as one newspaper argued, it is ironic that CEOs of major corporations know much more about the business environment of Malaysia than South Central Los Angeles. In the end, the LACDB has emerged as neither a good area-based nor a successful person-based economic development initiative. If America’s established companies are not interested in South Central, the Bank should be focusing on creating a business infrastructure that allows for the gradual growth of a healthy economy. This will involve the recognition that very few local entrepreneurs are interested in loans larger than $250,000, and almost none of them like the excessive reporting and paternalistic behavior that has been exerted by the LACDB. The Bank is under pressure to reduce its losses and protect the Section 108 money. Therefore, it behaves more like a Bank mixed with a usurer’s constant fear of losing its assets. Smaller loans through intermediaries, combined with collaboration on job training and job placement organization should form a better basis for a "community" development bank. This would be economic development through change agents and the existing infrastructure for micro-lending and capacity building. Furthermore, micro loans may not add additional jobs or increase substantial revenue to the community on a short-term basis, but they build social capital by providing much needed goods and services, while they build localized business knowledge and the potential for "smarter" economic growth. Micro-lending also brings the community voice back to the process, even if it is the economic voice of small entrepreneurs filtered and refined through the intermediaries’ assistance. Inherent in the design of community development is building the knowledge-base for envisioning, planning, acquiring resources, and implementing. Building locally, at scales that are more reasonable and do not follow either space or person-based anti-poverty agendas, is not only more equitable, but also directly affects the social infrastructure and attempts to decrease the gap in "relative" poverty, an approach forgotten in the wake of the "war on poverty." In the end, policies should be dealing with enhancing the capacity for envisioning a future (as individuals or a community, and not simply capacity building), rather than focusing on specific neighborhoods and the spatiality of politics. References Alcock, Pete; Craig, Gary; and, Thornton, Paul. 1996. Evaluating Local Authority Anti-Poverty Strategies. Paper presented at ESRC Seminar on Evaluating Policies to Combat Social Exclusion. University of West of England, Bristol, U.K. Brownstein, Ronald. December 16, 1996. Detroit Engineers Formula to Realize the Empowerment Zone’s Potential. Los Angeles Times. Burtless, Gary. February 2001. Has Widening Inequality Promoted or Retarded U.S. Growth? The Brookings Institution. Chandler, Mittie O. 1999. Staying the Course: Detroit’s Struggle to Revitalize the Inner City. In Rebuilding Urban Neighborhoods: Achievements, Opportunities and Limits, Keating, W. Dennis and Krumholz, Norman (Editors). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Community Development Agency, April 26, 1996. Empowerment Zone Oversight Committee Training Session on the Empowerment Zone. City of Los Angeles. Community Redevelopment Agency. January, 1989. Crenshaw Redevelopment Project, 1986-1988. Biennial Report. City of Los Angeles. Community Redevelopment Agency. June, 1989. Watts Redevelopment Project, 1987-1989. Biennial Report. City of Los Angeles. Community Redevelopment Agency. March, 1990. Hoover Redevelopment Project, 1988-1990. Biennial Report. City of Los Angeles. Community Redevelopment Agency. April, 1990. Adams Normandie 4321 Redevelopment Project, 1988-1990. Biennial Report. City of Los Angeles. Community Redevelopment Agency. September, 1990. Normandie 5 Redevelopment Project, 1988-1990. Biennial Report. City of Los Angeles. Dear, Michael J. 2000. The Postmodern Urban Condition. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. Gale, Dennis E. 1996. Understanding Urban Unrest: From Reverend King to Rodney King. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. Gittell, Marilyn; Bockmeyer, Janice; Lindsay, Robert; and Newman, Kathe. 1996. Expanding Civic Opportunity: The Urban Empowerment Zone. Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Conference of the Urban Affairs Association. Gittell, Marilyn and Newman, Kathe. 1998. Empowerment Zone Implementation: Community Participation and Community Capacity. Howard Samuels State Management and Policy Center, The City University of New York. Greene, Richard. January, 1991. Poverty Concentration Measures and the Urban Underclass. Economic Geography. Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 240-252. Johnson, Hans P. and Tafoya, Sonya M. May, 2000. Trends in Family and Household Poverty. California Counts: Population Trends and Profiles. Published by the Public Policy Institute of California. Vol. 1, No. 3. Harvey, David. 1989. The Urban Experience. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Keating, W. Dennis and Krumholz, Norman (Ed). 1999. Rebuilding Urban Neighborhoods: Achievements, Opportunities and Limits. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Kilpatrick, Robert W. August 1973. The Income Elasticity of the Poverty Line. Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 327-332. Klein, Norman M. 1997. The History of Forgetting: Los Angeles and The Erasure of Memory. London: Verso. Knox, Paul L. 1993. The Restless Urban Landscape. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Landau, Madeline. 1989. Race, Poverty, and the Cities: Hyperinnovation in Complex Policy Systems. Public Affairs Report. Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 1, 11-13. Landau, Madeline. 2001. Seminar on community development. Organized by the Institute of Governmental Studies. Sacramento, California. Laslett, John H.M. 1996. Historical Perspectives: Immigration and the Rise of a Distinctive Urban Region, 1900-1970. Ethnic Los Angeles. Editors: Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Littman, Mark S. March, 1991. Poverty Areas and the "Underclass:" Untangling the Web. Monthly Labor Review. Pp. 19-32. Morrill, Richard L. and Wohlenberg, Ernest H. 1971. The Geography of Poverty. McGraw-Hill Book Company. Nietzsche. 1980. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by: Walter Kaufman. Penguin Books. O’Hare, William P. September, 1996. A New Look at Poverty in America. Population Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 2. Oakland, William H.; Sparrow, Frederick T.; and, Stettler, H. Louis, III. 1971. The Economic Implications of Area-Oriented Anti-Poverty Programs. Journal of Regional Science. Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-13. Ornati, Oscar (with the editorial assistance of J. Stouder Sweet). Poverty Amid Affluence: A Report on a Research Project carried out at the New School for Social Research. New York, Twentieth Century Fund. Putnam, Robert D., Leonardi, Robert, and Nanetti, Raffaella Y. 1994. Making Democracy Work. Princeton University Press. Rainwater, Lee. 1974. What Money Buys: Inequality and the Social Meanings of Income. New York, Basic Books. Rank, Mark R. and Hirschl, Tomas A. 1999. The Likelihood of Poverty Across the American Adult Life Span. Social Work. Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 201-216. Ross, Bernard H. and Levine, Myron A. 1996. Urban Politics, Power in Metropolitan America. 5th Edition. Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. Sawhill, Isabel and Thomas, Adam. December, 2000. A Hand Up for the Bottom Third: Toward a New Agenda for Low-Income Working Families. The Brookings Institute. The U.S. Census Bureau. 2000a. Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Families 1966-1997 (1997 dollars). http://www.census.gov. The U.S. Census Bureau. 2000b. Table IE-3. Household Shares of Aggregate Income by Fifths of the Income Distribution: 1967 to 1999. http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/table2.html Wood, Daniel B. and Teicher, Stacy A. July 9, 1999. Can Private Sector Rescue America’s Slums? The Christian Science Monitor.
Figure 1 – Geography of Poverty and the Location of the Supplemental Empowerment Zone
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