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URBAN POLICY AND POLITICS IN TWO AMERICAN CITIES: JERSEY CITY AND DETROIT
Paul Lawless
Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research
Sheffield Hallam University
City Campus
Howard Street
Sheffield
S1 1WB
Tel: (0114) 225 3529
Fax: (0114) 225 2197
Email: P.L.Lawless@shu.ac.ukAcknowledgements: This paper is based on work undertaken as part of a Research Fellowship and Grant awarded by The Leverhulme Trust. The author gratefully acknowledges the Trust's support for this work.
Thanks are also due to Alan DiGaetano (Baruch College, The City University of New York), Robin Boyle (Wayne State, Detroit) for their invaluable help and to a Visiting Fellowship awarded by Wayne State.
INTRODUCTION
Jersey City and Detroit provide contrasting experiences of two American local administrations facing up to the problems of economic retrenchment which are familiar to many British cities. The former is a relatively small, ethnically diverse, authority of about 230,000, of whom almost one-fifth were born outside the United States, located on the western side of the Hudson River, directly opposite Lower Manhattan. Detroit is very different. The problems associated with economic collapse, suburbanisation and racial strife have been well documented (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999; Sugrue, 1996; Thomas, 1997). The scale of decline is startling: population totals have halved to less than 1 million in fifty years; up to one-fifth of children have lead poisoning; there are at least 10,000 abandoned buildings; perhaps two-thirds of families are on low to moderate income; some 80% of homes were built before 1960; there is little public transport; and the downtown area designed originally to service a much larger and wealthier population is desperately run-down. Not surprisingly Detroit is often perceived as the international icon of urban decline. How are economic development and regeneration policies effected in these two administrations, what tensions does this create, and how can we explain political and policy change?
In Detroit sixteen, and in Jersey City fifteen, in-depth (90 minutes plus) qualitative interviews were undertaken with key policy officials, politicians and community activists during 1999. These people hold critical positions in the cities concerned: Chief Executives, Directors of Planning, Housing, and Economic Development Departments, Directors of large Community Development Corporations and so on. Three main areas of debate were pursued: an exploration of the major policy issues impacting on the area; inter-actions amongst agencies and key actors; and questions of equity. The intention was not so much to establish 'facts', but rather to tease out tensions in economic development: the 'politics' of local policy making. This material is developed below and subsequently embedded within wider theoretical and conceptual debate. Respondents were assured of anonymity in the recording of their comments.
THE CONTEXT FOR LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For much of the post-1945 period both cities lost manufacturing jobs through rationalisation and relocation. In the case of Jersey City, the problem is identified in the Economic Development Program for the wider Hudson County as consisting of 'the abandonment of rail yards, deterioration of piers, loss of industry, decline in population and increasing vacancies in waterfront and other industrial properties from the 1950s through the 1970s' (Hudson County Improvement Authority, 1994). As a result of these kinds of processes, one observer at the centre of efforts designed to reinvigorate Jersey City's economy considers that, ‘the availability of the traditional rust belt jobs is just not there any more’. New types of economic activity have come to the fore being driven by the relocation of commercial and residential activity from Manhattan. In the early 1980s two waterfront projects, Newport and the Colgate site proved critically important in helping to re-orientate market perceptions of Jersey City. The former involved the use of private sector investment coupled with the largest ever $40m Urban Development Action Grant and associated Community Development Block Grant for new residential and commercial development on land formerly used for industrial and military functions. Newport's ultimate development over the succeeding years will make it one of the largest residential/commercial development on the entire New Jersey/New York region, containing over 9,000 residential units and more than 10 million square feet of offices. The Colgate site revolved around the successful commercial redevelopment of a former toothpaste manufacturing plant, becoming as a result ‘a new bellweather in Jersey City for this scale of commercial real estate’, not least because it attracted blue-chip tenants such as Merrill Lynch and US West. These developments proved critical in moving Jersey City along what several commentators referred to as a ‘natural progression of development’ from a previous dependence on manufacturing, blue-collar jobs towards an economy centred on relatively higher value, and higher wage, activities as the City sought to consolidate its role as a 'world-city spillover' administration.
But this transition has not always been easy to effect. Several commentators point to the marked contrasts between the economic environment if the late 1980s and early 1990s and that prevailing in more recent years. Despite the success of the Newport and Colgate developments alluded to above, ‘nothing moved’ and ‘nobody wanted to be a pioneer’ during the early 1990s. But later in that decade the situation improved. Jersey City in common with other localities in New Jersey, notably Hobboken, benefited from national economic growth in general and its particular manifestations in Manhattan. Activity was also assisted by infrastructural developments notably the City's location on the PATH fast transit into Manhattan and the construction in the late 1990s of the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Transit System linking waterfront developments along the New Jersey shore. Growth in demand for new commercial and, especially, residential development in Jersey City has become so acute that some at the centre of the redevelopment debate have become positively selective about the nature of growth: ‘we don’t want to overheat, to overfill the market to the point where there are empty buildings’. And there is a general belief, too, that this more selective approach can succeed. In part this is premised on the belief that Jersey City can respond to the commercial market’s need ‘to build new space of such efficiency in a fraction of the time (compared with the situation in Manhattan) to keep up with their pace of growth’.
In Detroit too there have been spectacular achievements in recent decades. The big three motor manufacturers, General Motors, Ford and Daimler-Chrysler, have invested in plant and commercial development in, and around, the city, including car production at Poletown for General Motors and Chrysler's Jefferson North Assembly plant. Some downtown riverside development occurred, most notably the Renaissance Project constructed in the early 1970s and more recently casinos, sport stadia, and some new residential developments. Official unemployment rates stand at about 5%, much lower than equivalent figures evident in the late 1980s, although still higher than those evident in the surrounding region.
However until some of the more recent developments came on the scene, activity was limited. One observer has described the city as an 'American Acropolis', a publicly supported monument to the decay of an industrial past (Vergara, 1995). The city is still widely perceived as classically reflecting the insidious consequences arising out of the collective impact of that constellation of factors which has so undermined urban America: suburbanisation driven by Federally funded road construction programmes, an especially unfortunate process in the 'motor-city'; economic rationalisation and relocation; the 'privatisation' of facilities; declining public sector services; a local government system divorcing core cities from their suburban populations; and, especially relevant to Detroit, racial politics nurtured through socio-economic processes that have so strongly sustained a black impoverished Detroit surrounded by, on the whole, much richer and overwhelmingly white suburbs. One outcome of these processes according to one local academic was that 'nowhere came close to Detroit in many definitions of distress'. Official rates of unemployment in the later 1980s were as high as 16%, a figure which ignored at least 100,000 unrecorded people. But in common with other observers he is of the view that there has been an improvement; 'there is definitely an element of things happening... things in the ground'. As proof of this he quotes the first recorded increase in total assessed property values in the city since the 1960s, rising house prices in the late 1990s and an increase in 25,000 of Detroit residents in work between 1991 and 1997.
Political Leadership
In the case of Jersey City the mayor, Bret Schundler, is widely perceived as being an effective broker between the city and the market. Those involved in development were universally of the view that ‘leadership has to be pro-development..., has to create the development friendly environment, or the development wouldn’t take place’. And being development friendly means that sometimes politically unpopular decisions have to be taken in ‘order to do the good government thing’. For example local tax policies which provided 15 year abatements for new commercial developments, were widely seen as politically unpopular within the City as a whole. But some interviewees argued that these had proved crucial in attracting new development in that they provided stability and were ‘competitive’ with what was being offered by other administrations in the region. Certainly in his public statements Schundler espouses a markedly strong pro-business line in emphasising the City's financial prudence and the favourable tax regime: ‘We have no payroll tax; no city sales tax; no city income tax; no corporate tax; no personal property tax; no tax on unincorporated business; and no tax on commercial rent'; (Schundler, 1998, 17).
In addition the City's appeal may have been enhanced through the activities of several agencies dedicated to economic development. The city's Division of Economic Development is designed to co-ordinate economic development activities. A Redevelopment Agency with powers of eminent domain (compulsory purchase) takes an overview of activity in 60 redevelopment areas, collectively amounting to more than 40% of the City. And an Economic Development Corporation with an overtly entrepreneurial flavour undertakes training, support for community development corporations, and business loans: ‘we assist the private sector with what they want'. It may appear that this myriad of agencies would lead to a degree of confusion within, and outwith, the city administration. But this was not the view of those involved. Ultimately the ‘head honcho' was the Director of the Economic Development Division who should be ‘indicating what should happen, clarifying things for the Redevelopment Agency if they aren't sure who's supposed to be doing what,...'. But in reality because people had ‘been around so long' this was rarely a problem... 'we all talk to each other; we're all in the know; developers don't get stuck in this, you know, whether the guy that's down the hall has no idea what you're doing...'. Having this mix of agencies was also important in helping to pull together two key attributes to successful urban development: effective zoning and an aggressive policy of drawing down funds. In terms of the former, one of the key functions of the Redevelopment Agency has been to have approved a Master Plan for Jersey City which includes detailed zoning for a number of development sites: ‘The zoning's been in place, the master plan's been approved,... so when someone walks in and we tell them they can have building permits in 60 to 90 days, they're falling on the floor; firms from Manhattan can't even get to see the right person for 60 to 90 days, let alone be putting stakes in the ground.'
A second benefit ostensibly flowing from this mix of agencies is access into what is a potentially rich diet of Federal and State programmes. Some of these are seen as especially important because they are directed at job creation through tenants rather than supporting physical development. The point was made that there are only a relatively small number of developers: ‘its not hard to keep a handle on that'. But commercial tenants are more difficult in that there are more of them and you never know when they will appear'. So having a state programme such as Business Employment Incentive Programme providing a direct rebate on state taxes for those employing more than 25 new employees, has been 'very, very helpful'. This view is by no means confined to Jersey City. Others exploring revitalisation in the wider New York region suggest that 'the availability of federal funding programs, along with the initiatives of local officials are then the key mechanisms that trigger, enable and sustain urban revitalisation efforts' (Rogowsky, Berkman with Strom and Maniscalco, 1995, 101).
There are similarities between Jersey City and trends observed by those close to political leadership in Detroit. In particular there is a marked sense that the political leadership has changed, and with it the role and function of local economic development agencies. Across a wide range of observers, academics, policy makers, politicians, and community leaders, there is a view that the election in 1993 of Dennis Archer as mayor, represented a marked transition in local politics when compared with what was happening under Coleman Young's previous administrations. One black woman at the centre of a major economic growth initiative in the city sees it as the biggest single change in accounting for the apparent improvement in Detroit's status: 'some people minimise it, but I think it's huge; Detroit's open for business and it will work with anyone...'. Unlike the situation under Young, the local political scene 'is not a political crony thing'. The Executive Officers at Detroit Renaissance - a major private sector development and lobbying organisation consisting of major business leaders from the city and its wider region, concur with this view: 'our Board strongly supports this mayor... he has tremendous private sector support'. This perspective complements the views of other commentators: 'as Mayor Archer's first term ended in 1997, the consensus among observers was that... Archer skilfully courted the business community, the local media, and surrounding suburbs' (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999, 122).
But however much Archer is seen as more likely, as one academic suggests, to 'reconnect' Detroit into the wider economy, he operates within a complex institutional environment. At one level there is again what can appear a dense network of economic development agencies: an Economic Growth Corporation, a Planning Division, an Economic Development Division, a Greater Downtown Partnership, Detroit Renaissance, and so on. Not surprisingly opinion is divided as to the rationale for this structure. Those active within the agencies see a logic to it. The Economic Growth Corporation is intended to act as a one stop shop for larger projects, the Downtown Partnership majors in the conversion of older premises into residential accommodation, and so on. Exactly because of this range of tasks, one insider suggests that 'one agency would have to be huge to handle it all'. But equally so those outside this loop are sceptical. To one observer with previous experience of working in the private sector, but now working for the city, 'there are times when our customers ask who's in charge... I'm looking at a better definition of tasks and roles'.
But if there is some disagreement about the rationale for the institutional structure within which local economic development operates, there is an overwhelming sense that the instruments through which the process of economic development is effected are inadequate, or as one interviewer suggested 'woeful'. The Planning system is perceived as Byzantine and irrelevant. A key actor in that department suggests that the Master Plan 'holds no meaning'. In part this reflects a complex process of land use planning undertaken by the city during the 1990s. In 1994 a Land Use Task Force produced broad strategy for the city as a whole (City of Detroit, 1994). However it also suggested that ten more detailed community re-investment strategies should be effected, which were produced in the late 1990s (City of Detroit, undated). This process inevitably created delays, whilst according to a senior planner culminated in revitalisation strategies which 'do not fully reflect the community out there'. In addition other spatial investment programmes were being implemented in the mid to late 1990s. In 1995 Detroit was one of six cities awarded Empowerment Zone status for an area covering more than 18 square miles and accommodating over 100,000 people. The strategy governing the Zone emphasises economic opportunity and new housing. Total public and private sector investment of almost $4bn was announced between 1995 and 1997 (City of Detroit, 1997). In addition in 1997 the city was also selected as one of the state of Michigan's Renaissance Zones. In 6 parcels, collectively amounting to over 1,300 acres, almost total tax relief is provided to both businesses and residents. There is a strong sense within the Planning and Development Department that what has not been achieved is a synthesis across 'all of those elements which pack down into a plan which means something'.
One reason cited for this deficiency is 'bureaucracy'. One comment made by virtually all of those interviewed was the degree to which an inefficient local bureaucracy had inhibited development. To one senior official in housing it appeared that 'we're still incredibly, incredibly slow in our bureaucratic processes...; they just have to be re-engineered'. There are several dimensions to this concern. Some staff and the systems they operate are perceived as inadequate. To a senior city official, it appears that the 'systems are awful' and staff 'do not understand the importance of public service'. In part staff lack appropriate skills and experience 'to push projects through or to work out solutions for those projects which run into trouble'. These constraints are identified by some as being especially evident in relation to the city's Empowerment Zone. Whereas its strategic planning is seen as 'very good', several observers agree with a senior economic development adviser that 'insufficient attention has been given to mechanisms for spending'. The policy environment surrounding the Zone is so 'fragmented, dependent on lots and lots of implementing agencies; some are good, some are not so good'. The local press launched a 'cut red tape' campaign in spring 1999, arguing that by 1998 the City had more than $400m of unspent federal funds accruing over a period of up to twenty years. Much of this represented unused resources allocated to public housing ($127m), community development ($106m) and the empowerment zone ($90m) (Detroit Free Press, 24.3.99).
In addition local commentators also identify a lack of innovation on the part of the city's staff. To one senior planner recently moving into the city, it seems clear that whereas other conurbations such as Boston and Philadelphia had 'invented new ways to fund and subsidise projects… to lever in the private sector... we just don't do that'. And underpinning all of this debate is the insidious problem of land ownership and acquisition. To those from Renaissance speaking on behalf of the private sector this issue appeared little more than 'a constant struggle'. But this is a very difficult issue. Massive decentralisation of people and jobs has led to declining equity and increasing vacancy which eventually triggered the implementation of a complex process involving the city and the state designed ultimately to allow authorities to acquire title and facilitate redevelopment. Because ownership is often contested or unknown, the process can be subverted at any stage by anyone claiming interest: the land problem is now 'our biggest issue'.
Conflict and Consensus in Local Policy Making
The political system in Jersey City is based on an Executive Mayor to whom the nine heads of department report. There are nine councilmen, six associated with wards and three at large. The mayor is, unusually, a Republican, and perhaps exactly because of that has supported a wide range of regeneration initiatives. ‘He needs to hang his hat on something. He doesn't have a political vanguard. He's a Republican in a Democrat stronghold, so he's got to be populist to everyone.' This tendency for politicians and officials to use established community groups to legitimise their activities is evident in other American cities (Chaskin & Abunimah, 1999). The mayor tends to carry five of the councillors with him on most issues. The remaining four have taken issue on a number of localised development issues including opposition to re-zoning for high value residential development and the location of sites for affordable housing. The latter has proved especially contentious. One city official had been placed under ‘considerable pressure' from one councillor to restrict the development of additional affordable housing which was ‘right in conflict with Federal regulations'. Partly as a result of this stance her own promotion to head up the city's Housing, Economic Development and Commerce Department was delayed (Urban News, 12.3.99). However, much of the more contentious debate is, according to one key city official, of a ‘non-philosophical nature’. ‘There are healthy dialogues (over zoning) - it's easy to retreat into rateables, look at the taxes these things will pay... but there's also building communities, building neighbourhoods... creating identity and a sense of place'; ‘we're feeling market pressures to upzone this, to develop that'.
The position in Detroit bears some similarities to the situation in Jersey City. The administrative structure is based on a strong Mayor together with 9 at-large councillors. The two power bases are 'often at odds', in that, according to one local academic, councillors try to portray 'themselves as the minority party, protecting the city from the mayor'. Many tensions between the mayor and councillors are most obviously manifest in 'disagreements over process and control; a lot of time that trickles down into specific projects'.
Race is always a major factor in the politics of economic development in the city. A key black player in one agency is quite clear about this: 'the whole history of the city is based on that (race)...; but it's not just an issue of race but also of racism... Companies did not want to relocate because it's 80% African American; it became a city of the disenfranchised and the poor; the business community was - and is - Caucasian...; when the racial split occurred (the mass migration of whites to the suburbs) there was also an economic split'. There is still a strong sense amongst - the overwhelmingly black - senior officials in economic development agencies that race remains a critical issue for the city. This operates at several levels. The black community is seen to carry little economic clout: 'the concentration of economic capital is not with the African American community'. The role of blacks in terms of enhancing high value added entrepreneurial activity is perceived as 'minimal', by one well located black observer. There are a few 'stars and then a huge gap to thousands of badly financed, marginal, service, Mum and Pop organisations'. The white community and its associated capital show continuing reluctance to invest in the city. 'I'm not going to drive in on those freeways', is perceived as a typical attitude on the part of those living in the suburbs towards down-town. This perception is confirmed by other work. A survey of black and white employers in Detroit concludes that 'white employers also stress that their inwardly self-definitional sense of the city - what they consider its cultural characteristics: its crime, vacancy and the hard lives of its residents - gets them down' (Meiklejohn, 1998, 364).
But there is too a dynamism to race. Investment in the city has increased. The mayor is seen as 'not taking sides' on where this money comes from. He is giving out messages that projects in Detroit do not need to 'take on this or that African American to make it work'. None of the three casino licences went to local black capital for instance. But others in the black community do take sides: 'the colour of money matters desperately in this town'. To one observer this has sharply divided the local black community. Some state publicly that 'we don't want their money - stay out'; others take a more instrumental view; 'we stayed; we're here, they left and now we want their money'. Some point to a growing cadre of black entrepreneurs who 'you want to favour, because they can do it'. Others take an explicit 'open to everybody' line. With such markedly different positions being adopted 'it can get boisterous out there'.
Strategy in Economic Development
In Jersey City, the key force stimulating redevelopment along the waterfront has been the dramatic increase in demand for residential development. This is manifest in the building of more than 5000 units in the 1997-99 period. One interviewee suggests that demand for waterfront luxury housing is proving ‘insatiable’, being driven by ‘extraordinary’ rents, which are, nevertheless, a third lower than those prevailing over the river. By 1999 some 2,300 apartments had been rented in the massive Newport complex opposite Manhattan. Such development is generally welcome but brings problems in its wake. For example there remains a tension between the realisation that virtually any site can be marketed for residential use, when the city wants ‘to create more employment... and other spillover effects that come from jobs’. Strong demand for residential development is also seen as creating additional pressures on the educational system. Much of the new housing is aimed at young, high-income, one and two person households, (frequently referred to as ‘pioneers’), many of whom do not have children. But this situation will change, thus creating challenges for a range of social and educational services.
The position in Detroit is rather different. Several key players voice the opinion that, although the city has traditionally been 'desperate for development.... we're at a point where there is a sense of demand, so we're less desperate'. This demand is driven by a number of impulses, some particular to the city, others more reflective of urban change as a whole. 'We're open to a range of strategies... industrial zones, commercial and retail and residential zones'. One, lone voice, saw real opportunities for the city to benefit from manufacturing investment. 'Just in time' and other technological and managerial innovations had, he suggested, encouraged the motor industry to refocus its activities within its traditional Michigan heartland: 'it's coming home... are we the Motor city'. Whatever the truth of this assertion, it is not easy to see Detroit as opposed to the wider region benefiting a great deal. All three major car producers have invested in, or close to, the Empowerment Zone. However these are either relatively insignificant, such as Ford's long term agreements with minority suppliers, or reflect the completion of previously agreed projects such as GM's commitment to expand its Hamtramck assembly plant. Other opportunities for enhanced economic activity in manufacturing and allied activities are seen as arising from the city's location on the Canadian border, an increasingly attractive location in the context of the NAFTA.
However, other sectors are widely seen as potentially more rewarding than manufacturing: service sector employment; entertainment and retailing; and new forms of residential development. One key player in a major development agency remains optimistic about service sector employment. 'Detroit remains the centre (of the wider region); there are seats of government here; some larger financial and legal firms ... and a major medical industry... are all still focused here; the banks have been real good about staying and maintaining their investment downtown...'. Other commentators are however less sure about growth in service sectors: 'there just isn't the critical mass anymore' and point rather to the minimal development occurring alongside the waterfront. Developments have occurred there recently however most notably the acquisition by General Motors of the Renaissance Center in 1997, and its decision to re-locate there its corporate headquarters from the New Center some five miles south of the river. This may have considerable spin-off effects in relation to the Downtown area. Currently however much of the area remains under-developed. Immediate gains are generally seen as more likely to spin off from aspects of consumption: retailing, entertainment or what is increasingly referred to as the three Cs: coliseums, conventions and casinos. There have been successes here including the granting of licences to three casinos, the development of two major sports stadia for the city's baseball and basketball teams, and the renovation of the Fox Theatre and the Opera House. 'We want to get people back on the streets... we want to draw people in from the suburbs'. Conversions of older retail, commercial and industrial buildings to residential use have sold well too. However not all new housing proposals have not all been implemented as planned. In part this is due to a real appreciation that redevelopment requires changes across the board: 'unless you fix the housing, bring in the schools... you're not going to have sustained change'. And to perhaps the most reflective of those interviewed, all of this apparent change still amounted to 'hype.... it's still a reactive strategy..'.
Linking Economic Development and Social Regeneration
In Jersey City the sentiment is frequently voiced that pursuing regeneration based on high rental residential development and commercial activity, will accentuate divisions in the city. One planning official argues that ‘the issue is spillover and overall benefit, trying not to have a tale of two cities, trying not to create a new city and leaving an old city in its shadow'. However not everyone accepts that this has actually occurred. To a, white, community based worker developing low cost home ownership in a working class area, the benefits appeared thin: ‘economic development is great... but what you are seeing is a lot of high rental units, a lot of back office operations from big companies... instead of commuting to Manhattan they're just commuting to Jersey City. So the number of local jobs that are being created is not significant...; you're creating an environment where it's a 9-5 city on the waterfront and then, after 5 o'clock, it's like Wall Street after the markets close'.
Efforts to spread economic benefits across the community are effected through a number of mechanisms. In line with other administrations seeking to impose performance agreements (Sullivan & Green, 1999), under the City's First Source Agreement, companies receiving tax abatements are required to use a Jobs Registry and to give five days' notice of jobs prior to their being advertised. If locals are not selected this needs to be documented. ‘If we know people are coming over (from Manhattan), whilst they're building the building, we'll have our training people doing the training... so that they'll have a skilled (and local) labour force'. The city has also created five Special Improvement Districts (SIDs) away from the waterfront. These include Journal Square and Martin Luther King Drive, large, somewhat dilapidated retail cores. The intention is to undertake locally agreed improvement programmes: ‘do some marketing, pay for additional street cleaning, beautify the area, additional security perhaps...'. A Corporation has been created in each SID to oversee improvements and to provide low cost business loans. SIDs are funded by existing enterprises, each of which pays about $200-$300 p.a.. SID resources are matched 4:1 by enterprise zone funds in the first year, declining to 1:1 in the fourth year.
Those involved in regeneration argue that there are limits on the scale of linkages which can be expected from incoming activity. One problem is inherent to the nature of new economic activity along the waterfront. Virtually all of this represents relocation of back-office service activity from Manhattan. Inevitably a large proportion of the incoming labour force - estimated by the city at about up to 80% - does not live in Jersey City. This is an issue which can be resolved; ‘we will achieve 50% to 60% in jobs locally, through attrition and because people will ‘want to live and work here'. There is some evidence for this. When Merril Lynch invested in the mid 1980s, only 4 out of 2000 workers lived in Jersey City, but that had risen to 450 in five years. There are however, tensions in relation to the scale of direct linkages which can realistically be expected from developers. ‘The attitude is to tag the developer... there is a point where you can take those freebies... but there is a point where it's just not tolerable'. There has to be a balance between achieving linkages to assist minority and disadvantaged communities on the one hand, whilst ensuring continued investment on the other: ‘cycles come and go... you want to catch the wave when the waves come in...'.
The unions have consistently, and often successfully, limited programmes designed to link minority groups into the benefits flowing from regeneration. The unions had been ‘hard to crack' was the view of one long standing observer. This tension has been most evident in relation to efforts made to impose ‘quotas' on the employment of local people in large construction projects. One community player points out that, 'they (the unions) organised against this and took us to court and won because they said it was restriction of trade'. This position was also - some thought - the view of construction companies too. Firms tended to play lip service to employing local people. However there was a reluctance on their part to use sub-contractors, often from minority communities, because ‘in the long run, this would cost more'. These trends appear to have disadvantaged minorities throughout the region's construction industry (Bates and Howell, 1998).
The situation in Detroit appears 'institutionally confused'. Key city based officials also argue that the approach is designed to be inclusive... we cannot have this rich city where we have areas of the city where we have these large concentrations of poverty..'. But such an approach will not be without 'its own problems: 'There's a lot of history and a lot of hurt and I (head of a major economic development agency) have to be part of that healing. We have to look at economic development and we have to look at inclusion at the same time'. However, one head of city department indeed argues that 'currently we don't have an official linkage policy'. That appears a little bald. Executive Orders require that firms assisted by the city use 'their best efforts' to get up to 30% of business from Detroit based companies. In addition a human rights review of projects can also be taken. This may result, for instance, in a situation whereby companies may bid and receive contracts from the city, but may also be told that 'they needed to work on a goal of a different mix of employees'.
But commentators also identify a series of constraints on linkage. Some reflect trends within the wider spatial economy. Job opportunities have drifted out to the suburbs, which creates 'a real problem for this huge city.... where 30% of households don't have cars'. Some argue too that the problems of linkage are bound to be accentuated by an economic development strategy which has emphasised the development of a number of key physical developments: casinos, sports stadia and so on. 'You don't win (elections) again by having a good training programme; you win again by having cranes in the sky'. One observer suggests that developments such as the three casinos have 'actually no connection whatsoever with the city of Detroit'. Others, whilst accepting that these kinds of developments represent a distinct change in approach compared with traditional economic activity, suggest that 'that's the way to go' pointing out that, apparently, more than half of the employees in the local casinos live in the city.
However, as ever, race adds a further dimension to questions of linkage. As one key player in the planning department puts it, for many, 'progress looks white as opposed to black'. To black critics of Archer's redevelopment policy it appears that 'he thinks like a whitey; his friends are white; all he has done is to bring the suburbs to the city'. In so doing, some argue, he has actually made the position worse for many in the black community. This perception on the part of many in the black community is fuelled by various processes. For example Archer has introduced substantial tax abatement programmes, some lasting up to 12 years in order to encourage development in the Renaissance Zone. Whilst generally welcomed by key economic development players, there is too an acceptance that this is seen by others as divisive because it stimulates 'development on the backs of those who can least afford it'. A planning system which is increasingly designed to support economic development in the city is also perceived as being an additional factor in accentuating social and racial divisions in the city. Some blacks argue that they have been 'disrespected' by the process, in that they have 'been excluded to make way for 'progress'. Whilst aware of these tensions, those charged with economic development remain committed to an 'inclusive' agenda... we're in this together'. According to the head of an economic development agency, the emphasis is being placed on encouraging 'feasible economic projects'. If this means more 'white pioneers 'moving into the loft conversions downtown' that's fine... it would be a mistake for me to suggest that because you are not African American you do not have the right to build or to provide jobs for all of Detroit'.
Whilst not as critical to economic development as in Detroit, race is nevertheless a pressing issue in Jersey City too. Unemployment rates for black males in Jersey City are double those for the state as a whole. Most saw limited evidence to suggest that minority businesses were able to feed off major investments beside the waterfront. ‘A real struggle to get black owned enterprises' was the view of a community level worker. The benefits from waterfront development are apparently still not percolating down to many in the black communities, a feature evident in other American cities (Judd & Swanstrom, 1998). The co-ordinator of a locally based black initiative some distance from the waterfront suggests that: ‘I can't say that those incentives actually benefit us in the sense that it helps the community at large. I mean twenty years from now it might benefit us... but the immediate impact... it's nil, I would say'.
There is a shared sentiment across both cities in respect of one barrier inhibiting linkage: education and training. There is a striking similarity in views expressed by commentators in both cities. One Jersey City based respondent with a remit to market development opportunities considers that ‘education is the single most important issue’ for both urban America in general, and the City in particular. There is evidence of poor educational attainment levels, in part because per capita investment in education is scarcely 60% of that in adjoining areas such as Hobboken. This weakness is paralleled in terms of basic training facilities leading to a situation where 'lots of young people all the time who want jobs, but don't have the skills; they just don't have anything to market'. These sentiments are echoed by key observers in Detroit. 'People are becoming less and less competitive', a not surprising situation for the city when more than half of young people do not graduate from High School. One observer refers to a 'structured underclass' often consisting of 'young people who are not trained for new opportunities'. The training which does occur through the State's Workforce Development Boards and, elsewhere, is widely seen as 'basic' and as increasingly focusing on the needs of younger people, because 'older workers are OK and quite frankly cheap, a plus from a business perspective'. According to one black community worker the systems are so weak that they 'continue to create near dependency', an approach which is calculated to ensure that 'in no way, shape or form' will it further encourage a brain drain.
Discussion
How do we interpret and locate the complementary and contrasting experiences of these two administrations? There are perhaps three levels to this debate: the role of, and constraints upon, local politics, questions of institutional complexity; and the relationships between these case studies and 'regime theory'.
Perhaps the single most consistent theme to emerge from these interviews, is the belief that change can be effected through the local/state political instruments, and that, in particular, the role of the mayor is critical in setting a context, a narrative, through which to drive change. Observers in Detroit, for instance, tend strongly to correlate apparent improvements in the city in recent years with the pro-business position adopted by Archer. The mayor becomes the city. He must provide 'leadership' within and outwith the city, sustain innovation, enhance image, pull strings at state and federal level, court business, set inclusive goals, and become a national icon of stability and rectitude.
But, as many accept, this perspective on the political primacy of the mayor needs contextualising. And predictably, the more distant observers are from the mayoral realm, the more they are inclined to do so. For instance, one caveat referred to by many local commentators is the extent to which both mayors, and especially Archer, face considerable local political opposition. In Detroit one observer argues that the 'opposition' councilmen see themselves as custodians of 'the heart of the city', a function which they effect in part through the existence of a discrete planning commission, in a sense shadowing proposals emerging from mayoral controlled city institutions. However, in practice because of the 'strong mayor' electoral system in both administrations, and because on most issues the two mayors tend to carry a majority of councillors with them, both cities can be categorised as either 'Rubber Stamp' or 'Weak Rubber Stamp' councils (Simpson and Carsey, 1999). Questions which divide the mayor from some councillors are, in any event, not philosophical. The issues which can distance both mayors from some councillors are rooted in other considerations: antagonised voices from local communities; the balance between residential and commercial development; and localised tensions as a result of particular projects. Much of this debate is thus, as one key witness comments, 'non-ideological'. Indeed the assumption is that much of the apparent division is driven by the need for all local politicians to maintain a high profile within electoral systems which encourage local politicians to play to city-wide, rather than, or at least in addition to, local constituencies. Other more insistent constraints impinge on their ability to effect change. Hay (1996) in exploring the articulation of power has identified the need to ensure that the activities of individuals and collective agencies are contextualised within layers of attendant structure. In this perspective social actors thus operate within complex, evolving and often only partially understood landscapes. And in the context of these two cities one of the most pressing contexts is undoubtedly institutional complexity.
Urban discourses tend often to emphasise questions of individual, and collective power. But efforts to explain what has happened in these two cities must of necessity embrace the 'institutional' dimension. As Pierre has argued in attempting to conjoin institutional and governance theories, 'understanding the capabilities of local government organisations is essential for an understanding of urban governance' (Pierre, 1999, 375). There are various dimensions to this debate. To the external observer, the economic development frameworks created in both cities appear immensely complex. A number of inter-related and overlapping agencies have been created some with specific spatial or sectoral remits, others with broader objectives. Many, although certainly not all of those, working within, or familiar with, these agencies are positive about this level of resource and do not see this apparent complexity as creating problems for the market, a critical consideration for administrations so heavily wedded to inward investment. This thinking may be seen to complement wider conceptual debates rooted in the idea that enhancing 'institutional thickness' may engender economic creativity (Amin and Thrift, 1992). However the evidence here, in line with findings from elsewhere (for example Raco, 1998), is that such 'thickness' may do little to enhance innovation and strategic thinking or to ease some of the more acute problems of implementation such as, say, problems of land acquisition which have so severely undermined redevelopment certainly in Detroit. In that city too there is a strong sense of institutional fragility. Respondents from development agencies are openly self-critical about the quality of their staff and the processes within which they work. One key player from an internationally renowned community project summed up a great deal of the frustration he and his colleagues had encountered: 'contacts (with the city) rarely generate reasonable help, in a reasonable time frame at an appropriate cost; the good people are just not in control'. One particular manifestation of institutional fragility is that cross agency and cross policy domain issues tend to be neglected. Education, widely perceived to be both critical to urban redevelopment, yet ostensibly under-developed in both cities, remains marginal to the regeneration debate. Yet as one black community worker in Jersey City points out he sees 'lots of young people all the time who want jobs, but don't have the skills: they just don't have anything to market'. And critically there remains a distancing between development agencies and wider community networks. Some American observers are strongly of the view that community and neighbourhood based networks can play a demonstrably important role in enhancing social capital and in encouraging civic renewal (Shirley, 1997). The evidence here from both cities, particularly Detroit, is that formal policies designed to embed less affluent communities within whatever benefits are occurring, remain insubstantial. In line with other findings, evidence here points to a continuing inability or unwillingness on the part of development agencies effectively to engage with, and to provide concrete gains to, the community sector (Bockmeyer, 2000). This complements the views of others. Kantor (1995, 155) suggests that efforts across the country to tease out wider benefits from inward investment are largely irrelevant because most linkages provide ‘petty benefits' which are best perceived as a ‘means of diverting public interference from the city's business development activities' (Kantor, 1995). And finally, and very predictably bearing in mind what has been said above, local institutions provide little in the way of originality. Strategy is not very subtle. It is about getting a fair share of what is on offer. In Jersey City this means encouraging the relocation of residential and commercial activity from Manhattan by appearing ‘market-friendly' providing a rapid response to issues of zoning and planning permissions, and celebrating successes. There is little in the way of more innovative policies in relation to economic clusters or market specialisation. As an approach, it is both predictable and in the especially favourable regional economic environment within which Jersey City operates, successful. Whether a similarly pro-business, inward investment orientated, strategy will reap similar benefits in Detroit is less certain. Indeed that city may continue to fare poorly because, according to some commentators, key locational requisites for business include labour skills and costs, proximity to markets and the availability of land, factors where Detroit remains relatively weak (LeRoy, 1994). Moreover, where the city is generally more competitive say in providing direct and indirect subsidies for major initiatives, there is no guarantee that subsequent developments are economically viable: 'critics often note that sports stadiums, convention centres, and other components of the recreation and tourist infrastructure rarely pay for themselves' (Judd and Swanstrom, 1998, 384).
Finally how do these case studies help inform debates surrounding regime theory? The evolution of, and efforts at categorisation within, regime theory have been widely discussed within American and British literature (for example DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999; Haughton and While, 1999; Logan, Whaley and Crowder, 1997). This is not the place to rehearse these well developed debates in any detail. There seems little to be gained either in disputing the notion that in both cities, more especially Detroit, if it is possible to identify 'regimes' at all, these are best described as 'pro-growth' or 'vendor' regimes (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999; Kantor, Savitch and Haddock, 1997). Interestingly neither city, certainly not Detroit, could be described as constituting a 'progressive' or 'welfarist' regime. This is perhaps not surprising in the light of the conditions which have been identified as critical to the emergence of such regimes (see Clavel 1986; Clavel and Kleniewski 1990; and Smith, 1989). In synthesising across this literature Nickel suggests that such criteria include a strong community movement with sufficient electoral power to push for alternatives to pro-growth, a waning business elite, and diminishing state and federal intervention, none of which pre-conditions apply to either city (Nickel, 1995). However where these case studies do provide more purchase is in their ability to help locate and contextualise efforts to explain urban governance. This is not intended as a criticism of regime theory per se, since one of its overarching attributes, arguably a principled drawback, is its apparent capacity to assimilate an enormous range of urban experiences. Nor are the issues explored below absent from all regime narratives. Nevertheless in any attempt to explain the governance of these cities the considerations developed below must loom large.
Any notion that governance emerges from a voluntaristic coalescence of actors and agencies around agreed, if evolving, policy agendas, gains little credence from these cities. There is it is true a driving imperative around jobs, business development, inward investment and image within a conceptual framework rooted in urban competition. But different actors and agencies have markedly different views about how to achieve these and how any gains which emerge from this process might be distributed. Of course there are contrasts between the two places. In Jersey City there is a sense that key agencies have presided over a more successful programme of development within a policy context which accepts that linkage remains a pressing issue. Whilst the implementation of key projects has become more obvious in Detroit, observers are less sanguine about the future, less confident that any strategic programme is in place, unsure about the status of linkage programmes, and more inclined to locate the city's experience in wider process of racial and economic conflict.
Nevertheless there are also marked similarities in framing the governance of these two administrations. There is at times a surprising degree of conflict. That community representatives in both cities should criticise the scale of benefits to more deprived neighbourhoods is not unexpected. But other, openly voiced tensions are less predictable. Because of the scale of decline and the nature of local politics, these tensions are more obvious in Detroit, but they are not absent from Jersey City. Department heads criticise the quality and motivation of staff and the systems and personnel with which they work. The private sector distances itself from the 'bureaucratic morass' which some suggest surrounds city hall. Efforts to achieve job linkages into ethnic minorities are subverted by trade unions. Those working in the cities are wary of broader state or county institutions: 'they're Republican, we don't talk to them', was the flippant if illuminating comment from one economic development actor in Detroit, when commenting on the relationships between the city and surrounding administrations. City governance reflects, and in turn fuels, inter- and intra-agency suspicion. That doesn't mean that things cannot be achieved. As Savitch has pointed out local states are multi-dimensional entities, 'and their different dimensions act upon different agendas, address different problems, respond to different pressures, and reflect different constituencies' (Savitch, 1990, 152). Inevitably within this complex environment, and as other commentators have indicated, local politics can make a difference (Stone 1989). There are successes: new projects in Detroit, more explicit linkage programmes in Jersey City. But taken in the round these influences are relatively less significant in explaining the scale and direction of change than are more immanent socio-economic processes. Sites' perspective on governance in New York perfectly reflects this tension: 'the favoured conceptual tools of the urban regime literature continue to be useful in this task but by themselves result in analyses that are focused too insistently on public sector actors, local-state initiative and coalition building at the expense of market and community pressures, economic restructuring, and national state retrenchment' (Sites, 1997, 552). And in these cities the overwhelming imperative remains the economy: the opportunities for relocation, investment and equity gains provided by unprecedentedly favourable economic circumstances evident in the mid to late 1990s, tempered by the constant fear of retrenchment, an historical legacy of massive rationalisation in manufacturing, and the insistent tensions arising out of the racial and sectoral consequences of economic change.
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Workshop 2 |